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Abstract—Public blockchains should be able to scale with
respect to the number of nodes and to the transactions load.
Despite the large research and experimental effort, all known
approaches turn out to be tradeoffs that sacrifice security or
decentralization to achieve scalability. Actually, the blockchain
scalability trilemma has been informally proposed. This is related
to scalability, security and decentralization, stating that any
improvement in one of these aspects should negatively impact
on at least one of the other two aspects.
We introduce a new blockchain architecture that scales to arbi-
trarily high transactions workload provided that a corresponding
proportional increment of nodes is provided. In this scalability
process, no tradeoff on security or decentralization is required.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result of this kind.
While our result is currently only theoretic, we believe that our
approach could stimulate significant practical contributions.
Keywords—Blockchain, Distributed Ledger Technology, Scla-
bility, Security, Decentralization, Trilemma.
I. INTRODUCTION
The scalability aspect of public blockchains is extremely
important for their success. All communities and industries
engaged in the development of public blockchains strive to
create solutions to support a large number of nodes and/or
large workloads (in terms of transactions per second). While
distributed systems or peer-to-peer systems can scale very well
with respect to these parameters, blockchains, till now, have
represented a very hard challenge. The difficulty comes from
the interplay of contrasting requirement in blockchain design.
Vitalik Buterin, founder of the Ethereum project, summarized
his understanding about this problem by introducing the so
called blockchain scalability trilemma. This trilemma states
that regarding scalability, security and decentralization, any
improvement in one of these aspects negatively impacts on at
least one of the other two aspects.
Most of the scientific literature is focused on the scalability
of the consensus algorithm without taking into account the
impact of the other parts of the system. Consider an ideal,
fully decentralized, blockchain, in which nodes are all equal
(cpu, bandwidth, and storage, roles, etc.). Suppose to double
the number of its users. Intuitively, we may assume that also
the load and the number of nodes of the network are doubled.
Hence, the ratio between load and processing resources is
constant and scalability should, in principle, be possible.
Now consider current blockchains. The usual approach is to
broadcast all pending transactions and accepted blocks to all
nodes. In this case, each node become a scalability bottleneck
due to bounded processing power and bounded bandwidth of
each node. The obvious question is if it is possible to design
a blockchain in which all activities (consensus, storage, and
communication) are shared (and not just replicated) across all
nodes keeping security and decentralization intact.
Consider for example common committee-based
blockchains (e.g., Algorand [4] or EOS). A single committee
(and each single member of that committee) is processing
all the transactions to be included in the next block. Then
the block is broadcasted and all nodes should process all
accepted transactions (at least they have to store them). There
are several scientific works trying to provide better tradeoffs
by means of some form of sharding. In these works, the
blockchain network (comprising nodes, blocks, consensus,
and transaction history) is partitioned in several smaller
networks (shards), with some form of coupling among them.
In these solutions, the most hard-to-solve problems are
inter-shard transactions, which impair scalability if they are
many, and the limited size of shards, which impairs security.
The main contribution of this paper is a novel blockchain
architecture that does not rely on sharding and achieves
scalability without giving up on decentralization and security.
In our solution, transactions are processed in a pipeline. Each
stage of the pipeline is performed by several committees, in
parallel. We assume a solution, like that described in [1], in
which storage is shared across nodes. In our approach each
block contains only the hash of current state and transactions.
Hence, we only broadcast a constant amount of data for each
block. Also pending transactions are not broadcasted.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we quickly review some related literature. In Section III, we
provide basic terminology, definitions, and formally state our
problem. In Section IV, we focus on scalability problems of
current solutions. In Section V, we first present the main ideas
of our solution and then we detail the tasks performed by
committees. In Section VI, we formally prove correctness. In
Section VII, we formally prove scalability. In Section VIII,
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we discuss the effectiveness of our approach and several other
aspects. In Section IX, we draw the conclusions and discuss
some related open problems.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Concerning scalability, the most remarkable results are
about some form of sharding, but all of them suffer, in different
ways, from the strong partitioning of the whole blockchain.
RapidChain [19] requires strong synchronous communication
among shards which is hard to achieve. AHL [6] is an
approach that turns out to be expensive when a transaction
involves multiple shards. Omniledger [11] requires every par-
ticipant in the consensus protocol (a subset of the nodes in
each shard) to broadcast a message to the entire network to
verify transactions. It also requires the users to participate
actively in cross-shard transactions verification. Elastico [13]
and Monoxide [17], require to execute expensive proof-of-
work to decide which shard should process a transaction.
Many other proposals are targeted to scalability of public
blockchains, like the EOS network that is analyzed in [18]
or Algorand [4]. However, they restrict their focus on the
scalability of the consensus algorithm.
A fundamental role in blockchain scalability is played by
Authenticated Data Structures (ADS) and related techniques,
since they enable architectures in which nodes only have
explicit knowledge of selected data while preserving security
on the whole blockchain state. The works [4] and [1] propose
to use authenticated data structures to scale with respect to
the size of the blockchain state. The work in [15] shows
a methodology for scaling the usage of authenticated data
structures that make use of a pipeline. A way of having
a persistent AD is described in [16]. Uses of ADSes for
efficient verification of data integrity in critical environments
are described in [10], [14], [9].
III. BASIC DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
In the following, we introduce some definitions and assump-
tions that are used in the rest of the paper.
We call candidate transactions those that are generated
by users but are not (yet) processed by the blockchain. A
confirmed transaction is a transaction that was successfully
processed by the blockchain. The history of the blockchain
is a totally ordered sequence of confirmed transactions. For
simplicity, in the rest of the paper, we mostly focus on a
simple model of blockchain that realizes a pure cryptocur-
rency. In other words, each address (or account) is associated
to a wallet with a non negative balance. A transactions just
moves currency from a wallet to another changing balances,
accordingly. While the results of this paper may be applicable
in a more powerful model, for simplicity, we do not consider
more complex cases. The state of the blockchain is the
balances of all addresses, at a certain instant. Confirmed
transactions are totally ordered. The state of the blockchain
is defined between two consecutive transaction. The sequence
of confirmed transactions is partitioned into blocks that are
sequentially numbered. Transactions are confirmed when a
new block is created (or mined). The mining of a new block
requires to (1) select a set of candidate transactions, (2) order
them, and (3) verify that certain consensus rules are fulfilled
when a transaction is applied to the previous state. In practice,
consensus rules may be complex but, in our simplified model,
they boil down to keep non-negative balances.
The nodes of blockchain network act as peers in the sense
that they perform the same actions. They broadcast candidate
transactions. Each node keep a set of candidate transactions it
knows (also called pending transactions). Nodes communicate
to perform a consensus algorithm (or consensus protocol) to
reach consensus on the transactions to be included in the next
block. This also implies a consensus on the state after the
block (i.e., after the last transaction of the block).
The stream of candidate transactions is the workload (or
simply load) of the blockchain and its magnitude is a fre-
quency measured in transactions per seconds. In the following,
we assume that accounts whose balance is changed by candi-
date transactions are homogeneously distributed on the address
space. The time a candidate transaction takes to be confirmed
is called (confirmation) latency. The maximum throughput of
the blockchain is the frequency of candidate transactions that
it is possible to confirm with bounded latency (i.e., avoiding
indefinitely growth of the set of pending transactions). When
workload is less than the maximum throughput we say that
the blockchain is well-provisioned.
Since we are interested in investigating scalability of
blockchains, we need tools to compare situations in which the
same blockchain vary the number of nodes and the workload.
We call proportional increment the situation in which the
load and the number of nodes proportionally increase. In
this paper, we consider all node to have always the same
constant amount of resources in terms of CPU, storage, and
network bandwidth. For simplicity, we also consider that all
communications between nodes are instantaneous.
Intuitively, each new node that joins the blockchain network
provides both additional load and additional resources. A
scalable blockchain architecture is able to take advantage of
this new resources to process the additional load.
More formally, we say that a blockchain architecture scales
when starting from a well-provisioned blockchain, increasing
load and nodes under the proportionality condition keeps the
blockchain well-provisioned.
IV. PROBLEMS OF CURRENT APPROACHES
In this section, we list some relevant aspects that make
current common public blockchains architecture not scalable
(according to the scalability definition given in Section III).
In this paper we focus on the following problems.
1) New candidate transactions are always broadcasted to all
(validating/mining) nodes.
2) There exists a set of (validating/mining) nodes (possibly
comprising all nodes), each processing all candidate
transactions that have to be included in the next block.
3) Each new block is broadcasted to all nodes.
Each of these aspects implies that, to well-provision the
blockchain, individual nodes have to increase computing
power and bandwidth even under proportionality condition.
We purposely avoid to mention scalability problems related
to the computational complexity of the consensus protocol,
since these three aspects are independent from it and are rele-
vant even for blockchains that adopt light consensus protocols.
We also avoid to mention the problem of storing the whole
blockchain state in each node, which is already addressed in
other works [1], [12].
In literature, most of the proposals that address the above
scalability problems introduce some form of sharding, which
is a way to partition the blockchain network and the transac-
tions, in effect, creating a sort of federation of a multiplicity
of blockchain networks. The sharding technique suffers of a
number of problems. The most hard-to-solve ones derives from
the fact that state is partitioned across shards. Hence, if shards
are many, most transactions turn out to change the state of
more than one shard. These are called inter-shard transactions.
Clearly, each transaction should be atomic, which is not so
simple to achieve in a sharded environment. Typically this
introduces inefficiencies related to inter-shard communication
(usually performed using some form of broadcast) and the
need of techniques similar to a two-phase commit to ensure
that all transactions executions are atomic. Another strong
criticism is about security, since smaller shards are supposed
to allow for better scalability but are deemed to be less secure
than larger ones.
The contribution of this paper is the description of an
architecture that aims at addressing the three above-mentioned
scalability problems. We do this without relying on sharding,
in the sense, in our case, the blockchain is one. However,
we introduce a way of dynamically sharing the load among
nodes. Our solution intends to apply a parallel version of the
Algorand consensus approach [4]. We also leverage the idea
of distributing the storage of the state, as described in [1].
V. A SCALABLE BLOCKCHAIN ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we describe an architecture that achieves
scalability, as defined in Section III. We first informally de-
scribe ideas that make scalability possible in our architecture,
then we list in detail all the components of the architecture
and their behavior.
A. Main Ideas
a) Committees: In our approach, there are a number of
committees that works at the same time. They collectively
perform the computation needed to validate and confirm
transactions and to compute the new block. For simplicity,
we assume that all committees are equal sized. Their size is
fixed and does not change when the number of nodes in the
network changes. Committee members may be fixed or may
change periodically to increase security. A discussion about the
impact of periodically changing the committees is provided in
Section VIII.
b) The block: Differently from the common approach, in
our architecture, a block conceptually aggregate transactions
and changes to the state, but this block content is never
explicitly represented in the block. In fact, the transactions
and state change related to a block are proportional to the
workload. Forcing a node to receive all of them would impair
scalability. Instead, for each new block, we only broadcast
constant size data. We call block this constant size data. Our
block can be considered equivalent in content to the block
header of other traditional approaches. For our theoretical
analysis, it is only relevant to know that the block contains
a hash of the blockchain state after the application of all
transactions of the block. In principle, it may also contain
a hash of the transactions of the block. However, since this is
not important in our analysis, we ignore it. The state hash is
computed on the basis of a Merkle tree, hence we call it state
root-hash. In the following, we explain how the computation
of the state root-hash is shared across several committees.
c) Storage: In our description, we focus on how the state
of the blockchain is stored. While storing transaction history
is also possible, this is not important for our analysis. For
scalability reasons, it is not possible for all nodes to store
all the state. This is not because of the size of the needed
storage (which we are not considering in our analysis), but
because processing updates to the whole state would require an
amount of resources proportional to the workload. Bernardini
et al. [1] and Vault [12] propose approaches that do not require
for all nodes to store the whole blockchain state and a node
may independently participate in storage and/or confirmation
activities. In the following, we refer to a node that stores a
part of the state as a storage node. In the cited works, on
the whole address space a (complete and binary) Merkle tree
is considered in which each leaf is an address (comprising
unused addresses). We denote this Merkle tree by W . Storage
nodes store only a part of the state and the corresponding part
of W , that covers all the paths from stored addresses to the
root, pruning the rest of W (see details in [1]). The root-hash
of W is the state root-hash.
d) Transaction creation: As in [1] and [12], a node n
that intends to create a transaction has the responsibility to
provide cryptographic proofs of the balances of the accounts
that are going to be changed by the transaction (i.e., the
involved accounts). These cryptographic proofs are asked by
n to storage nodes. Since each storage node stores a pruned
Merkle tree, they are able to provide that proof. However, as
will be clear in the following, the balances provided by storage
nodes are related to a state that is delayed by a few blocks.
The proof p obtained from a storage node is related to a state
of the blockchain after a certain block B, intending that its is
valid with respect to the state root-hash in B. We also simply
write that p is related to B. Since nodes store only a truncated
list of blocks (see below), proofs that are too old cannot be
validated and we say that they are expired.
e) Pipelining: Consider the computation needed to vali-
date and confirm transactions and then to compute the new
state root-hash to be included in a new block. The effort
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Fig. 1: Flow of data within the proposed architecture.
needed for this task is clearly proportional to the workload.
To scale, it is important to distribute this computation over
several committees. For this reason, we introduce a pipeline
in which the computation is performed in several stages.
Each stage is performed by one or more committees. In each
stage the computation can be further distributed across several
committees with a parallel approach.
We suppose that the time is spliced into equal length rounds.
Rounds are sequentially numbered. In each round, each com-
mittee performs its task for a certain pipeline stage. The result
of the computation is communicated by the committee to the
committees that need it for the next pipeline stage in the next
round. A discussion on the problems of this communication
is provided in Section VIII. For simplicity, we assume that all
communications are instantaneous.
We denote by Bi the block produced as output of the
last stage in round i. We denote the block that contains the
transactions that entered the pipeline at round i by Bi. If the
pipeline has q stages, the transactions that enter the pipeline
at round i, and that are accepted, will be part of the block
produced as output by the last stage that runs at round i+q−1.
Hence, we have that Bi = Bi+q−1. The first round in which
Bi can be used by any node is round i+ q.
Each produced block is propagated to all nodes. Nodes use
the state root-hash of the block to validate balance proofs
related to that block. Each storage node replies only with
proofs related to already produced blocks. For this reason,
the proofs that are associated with candidate transactions are
old by at least q rounds when they are processed by the first
stage where they are checked for validity.
f) Truncated block history: As in [1], we assume each
node does not keep all the blocks, but only the last d blocks
received. That is, at round i + 1, each node stores blocks
Bi = B
i−q+1, . . . , Bi−d−1 = Bi−q−d and previous blocks
are forgotten. A proof p related to Bj = Bj−q+1 is expired at
round i if j ≤ i− d (i.e., nodes have forgotten Bj needed to
validate p). Since the block Bi is available in round i + q, a
storage node replies with proofs related to Bi only during that
round. For the nodes participating in committees of the first
pipeline stage to be able to verify balance proofs, it should be
d ≥ q + 1.
B. The architecture
In Figure 1, we show the proposed architecture and the flow
of information within it. We describe it from left to right.
Any node can create a candidate transaction. As described
above, a new candidate transaction should come with balances
of the involved accounts and with corresponding proofs of in-
tegrity, related to a previous round. This can be obtained from
a storage node. Candidate transactions are not broadcasted into
the network (nothing is broadcasted in our approach but the
constant size blocks), but are sent to a limited number of nodes
as described below.
The validation of the set of transactions that have to be
included in a block is performed by Confirmation Committees
(CC). We denote each distinct CC by Ck with k = 1, . . . , Nc,
where Nc is the number of CCes. When relevant, we write Cik
intending to denote the k-th confirmation committee that runs
in the i-th round. The node that creates a new transaction x
sends it to Cik, with k = (hash(xsrc) mod Nc), where xsrc is
the account whose balance is charged by x. We intend that x
is received by Cik before the start of round i and hence C
i
k can
process it during round i. We say that Cik is responsible for that
transaction. The set of candidate transactions for which Cik is
responsible is denoted P (Cik). We denote by P
i =
⋃
k P (C
i
k)
the set of candidate transactions processed by any confirmation
committee in round i. The result provided by Cik is a sequence
of transaction denoted Aik, with A
i
k ⊆ P (Cik).
A fundamental aspect of the algorithm performed by Cik
is to obtain, for each transaction, the status of the source
balance at round i− 1 to compute the new balances at round
i with the transaction accepted for Bi. Since proofs attached
to transactions are related to rounds from i− q to i− d, they
always have from transactions balances that are verified but
old. In fact they can be outdated by transactions accepted in
the last q rounds for which the corresponding block is not
yet available. Hence, each Cik should also be aware of state
changes induced by transactions accepted by Ci−dk , . . . , C
i−1
k ,
which are Ai−dk , . . . , A
i−1
k , respectively. These transactions are
considered to update all balances involved in P (Cik) to their
status at round i− 1. We call time-updating this process.
In our model, Cik performs the following algorithm (by a
suitable consensus protocol).
Algorithm 1 (Confirmation).
1) It checks that each transaction in P (Cik) fulfills syntac-
tic rules and proofs are not expired. It discards non-
compliant transactions.
2) It selects an arbitrary order T for P (Cik).
3) Let T˜ be the concatenation of Ai−dk , . . . , A
i−1
k . For each
account that appears as source in transactions of P (Cik),
consider the last balance from T˜ and from the balances
provided by P (Cik).
4) It executes T and checks that the resulting balance of
each transaction fulfills the non-negative balance rule.
Transactions the do not fulfill this rule are discarded.
The resulting Aik is derived from T where discarded
transactions are omitted.
Transactions in Aik should be considered confirmed (or
accepted) in the sense they have passed all checks to be
inserted in Bi. To allow the confirmation committees of
subsequent rounds to perform time-updating, Aik is made
available to Ci+1k , . . . , C
i+d
k and also to other committees, as
explained in the following.
The sequence of accepted transactions for that round is
denoted Ai =
⋃
k A
i
k, where A
i is an arbitrary sequence that
respects the order of each Aik.
Even if Bi is yet to be computed, storage nodes can receive
from Cik state changes that will be part of B
i. Transactions
in Aik are selectively sent to the storage nodes that need it, to
update the part of the state they manage.
The actual computation of Bi requires to compute the state
root-hash at round i, which means computing all the hashes
of the conceptual Merkle tree W related to the whole state
space. This is performed by NR committees, called Root-hash
Pipeline Committees (RPCes). Each RPC is associated to a
part of W as shown in Figure 2, called underlying tree of the
level 1
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level 3=h
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
Fig. 2: The tree of conceptual Merkle tree W and the under-
lying trees of all RPCs. White nodes are pruned.
RPC. Each underlying tree is rooted to a node whose hash is
named sub-root hash. RPCes themselves form a tree denoted
by WRPC. Upon state changes, each RPC is responsible to
compute all hashes for its underlying tree. There are two
kinds of RPCes. Leaf RPCes, that are the leaves of WRPC,
and inner RPCes, that are all other RPCes. Each leaf RPC
is responsible for the interval of contiguous addresses that are
leaves of its underlying tree. Since most addresses are unused,
leaf RPCes consider a pruned version of the underlying tree
containing only the paths from its root to used addresses. The
underlying tree of inner RPCes are complete binary trees.
RPCes are partitioned in levels numbered from 1 to h. Level
1 contains all leaf RPCes. Level h contains only the root of
WRPC. Each level constitutes one stage of the pipeline. Hence
the total number of stages of the pipeline is q = h+ 1. Each
RPC at level i < h computes a sub-root-hash that is fed as
input to its parent in WRPC. The root of WRPC outputs and
broadcasts the new block with the corresponding state root-
hash. Theorem 2 of Section VII states that it is possible to
dimension the underlying tree of leaf and inner RPCes to
ensure scalability.
We write Ri to denote a generic leaf RPC that runs in the
i-th round. As mentioned above, the leaves of WRPC represent
the second stage of our pipeline. This means that they receive
the output of the first stage. Let i be the current round, they
receive Ai−1 from the CCes. In particular, each Ri ∈ WRPC
receives all and only the transactions in Ai−1 that modify the
balance of an address for which it is responsible. Hence, a
single accepted transaction is sent to two leaf RPCes. More in
detail, If x is a transaction in Ai−1k , C
i−1
k sends x to R
i only
if the source or the destination of x is an address for which
Ri is responsible. We denote with P (Ri) ⊆ Ai−1 the set of
transactions received by Ri from CCes at round i.
A fundamental aspect of the task performed by Ri (i.e.
calculate the sub-root hash of its underlying tree) is to obtain,
the status of underlying tree at round i − 1 to compute the
sub-root-hash at round i with the transaction in P (Ri). Since
P (Ri) is a subset of Ai−1, proofs attached to transactions are
related to rounds from i − 1 − q to i − 1 − d, they cannot
be used alone to computes all hashes of the underlying tree
at round i − 1. In fact they can be outdated by transactions
accepted in the last q− 1 rounds for which the corresponding
block is not yet available. Hence, each Ri should also be
aware of state changes induced by transactions received by
Ri−d, . . . , Ri−1 (all responsible for the same addresses inter-
val), that is P (Ri−d), . . . , P (Ri−1), respectively. These proofs
of these transactions are considered, according to their order,
to calculate all hashes of the pruning underlying tree related
to the state at round i− 1. We call time-shifting this process.
To allow the leaf RPCes of subsequent rounds responsible for
the same address interval to perform time-shifting, P (Ri) is
made available to Ri+1, . . . , Ri+d(all responsible for the same
addresses interval). Since P (Ri) is a subset of Ai−1, in our
protocol the CCes that executes at round i−1 makes available
P (Ri) to Ri+1, . . . , Ri+d.
VI. CORRECTNESS
In this section, we formally prove the correctness of the
architecture introduced in Section V.
The following lemma state the correctness of Algorithm 1
when run on only one committee.
Lemma 1 (Correctness of the confirmation algorithm). Algo-
rithm 1 never return a sequence that entails a violation of the
non-negative balance rule.
Proof. By construction of the result in Step 4 of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). Given a set of transactions P i pro-
cessed, at round i, by confirmation committees Cik producing
accepted transactions sequences Aik, the following statements
are true.
1) In any sequence Ai =
⋃
k A
i
k such that A
i respects
the order of each Aik, the non-negative balance rule is
respected.
2) The state root-hash that is the output of the last stage of
the pipeline at round i + q is the root-hash of the new
state after the application of Ai.
3) Storage nodes knows the proofs of the addresses they
store.
Proof. Concerning Statement 1, observe that Aik satisfy the
non-negative balance rule (Lemma 1) and their order is pre-
served by hypothesis in Ai. Since for each k the addresses
charged in Aik are not charged in any A
i
j with j 6= k, the
statement follows.
Concerning Statement 2, note that each leaf RPC Ri+1
considers all the transactions that involve addresses for
which Ri+1 is responsible that are present in sequences
Ai−q, . . . , Ai, respecting their order. RPC Ri+1 can correctly
compute its sub-root-hash to pass to its parent RPC. In
fact, if an internal node of its underlying tree is involved
in transaction, Ri+1 receives the proofs attached with the
transaction. If an internal node of its underlying tree is not
involved in transaction either it is pruned or it is a root of a
pruned tree. In the first case, Ri+1 does not need it. In the latter
case, Ri+1 receives its hash in one of the proofs available to
it. Since, internal RPCes always receive, form their children,
the hash values for all the leaves of their underlying tree and
their computation is trivial, the statement follows.
Concerning Statement 3, note that RPCes compute the root-
hash on the basis of a pruned version W ′ of W , where leaves
of W ′ are all used addresses U . Each storage node n stores a
pruned version Wn of W , where leaves of Wn are all addresses
Un that n intends to store. Since Un ⊆ U , also Wn ⊆ W ′.
Hence, all sub-root-hash of pruned subtrees in Wn are known
to one of the RPCes, which can communicate it to n.
VII. SCALABILITY
In this section, we formally prove the scalability of our ap-
proach. For real systems, the workload is usually characterized
by probability properties. For simplicity, in our statements and
proofs, we reason as if the workload were deterministic.
We start by introducing some notation. We denote by f the
frequency of transactions of our workload. We denote by ∆
the duration of a round. We denote by m = 2f∆ the number
of addresses whose balance changes in each round. We denote
by e the maximum number of balance changes that a leaf RPC
can process in one round. As explained in Section V-B, the
underlying tree of an inner RPC is a complete binary tree.
Suppose that an RPC can compute j hashes in one round.
The maximum number of nodes in the underlying tree of an
inner RPC is jˆ = 2k−1, where k is the largest possible integer
such that jˆ ≤ j. We can now state the following lemma about
the number of RPCes.
Lemma 2. The total number of RPC in the architecture
described in Section V is
⌈m
e
⌉
+
⌈dm/ee − 1
jˆ
⌉
, where the
first term is related to leaf RPCes and the second term is
related to inner RPCes.
Proof. The number of leaf RPCes is
⌈m
e
⌉
, which is the first
term of the formula. Now, consider the Merkle tree W , defined
in Section V, and remove all the underlying trees of leaf RPCes
but their roots, call W this tree. Note that W is complete and
binary with
⌈m
e
⌉
leaves. A complete binary three with ` leaves
has 2`− 1 nodes, of which `− 1 are non-leaf nodes. Hence,
the number of inner nodes in W is
⌈m
e
⌉
− 1. Therefore the
number of inner RPCes is
⌈dm/ee − 1
jˆ
⌉
, which is the second
term of the formula, hence the statement holds.
The following theorem states the scalability of the approach
described in Section V, when nodes and workload are propor-
tionally incremented.
Theorem 2 (Scalability). Consider a system S, with N nodes,
realized as described in Section V, and well-provisioned for
a workload at frequency f , under the assumption that the
addresses involved in the transactions of its workload are
homogeneously distributed across the address space.
It is possible to provide a system S′, with αN nodes and
α > 1, that is well-provisioned for a workload at frequency
αf , under the same assumptions for the workload.
Proof. In S and S′, committees have the same processing
capabilities that are enough to process the load of S. We want
to prove that it is possible to have a number of committees in
S′ to process its load. We first derive the needed number of
CCes in S′ compared to that of S and then we do the same
for RPCes. Then, we show that they are compatible with the
increment of the nodes.
A workload at frequency f , generates f∆ transactions per
round. Let NC be the number of CCes in S. Since S is well-
provisioned, each CC is able to process f∆/NC transactions
per round. The load of S′ is αf , hence, with αNC CCes, we
obtain in S′ the same CC load as in S. Note that, the fact that
each CC have to re-process transactions accepted in a constant
number of previous rounds does not impact this reasoning.
In S and S′, for each round, each leaf RPC can process
e balance changes and each inner RPC has an underlying
graph of jˆ as defined before. Since S is well provisioned,
for Lemma 2, the number of RPCes in S is NR =
⌈m
e
⌉
+⌈dm/ee − 1
jˆ
⌉
, where m = 2f∆. Analogously, for S′ to be
well-provisioned, the number of its RPCes must be N ′R =⌈αm
e
⌉
+
⌈dαm/ee − 1
jˆ
⌉
. In both NR and N ′R the first term
(related to leaf RPCes) is largely dominating, since jˆ is
supposed to be large. Hence, N ′R ' αNR. Consider also that
effects of the ceiling function can be compensated by a small
overprovisioning of S.
Since the increment of the number of CCes and of the
number of RPCs from S to S′ is by a factor of α, and S′
has αN nodes, the statement holds.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the effectiveness or our approach
and certain aspects that are not analyzed in the rest of the
paper.
a) Effectiveness with respect to the blockchain trilemma:
It is important to understand if the proposed approach is a
better solution to the blockchain trilemma than the previous
ones. This means understanding if scaling requires to limit
security and/or decentralization. The scalability of our ap-
praoch has been formally proved in Section VII. Concerning
decentralization, note that in our system all nodes cooperate
in the creation of a new block. Further, even if the committees
do not have all the same role, we can assign nodes randomly
to each of them (like, for example, in [4]), making their role
homogeneous when considered over a period time. While this
is an informal consideration, we believe that our approach does
not affect decentralization when scaling. Considering security,
note that many other research works and practical systems re-
lay on the security of a consensus algorithm run by a restricted
set of nodes forming a committee. The fact that in our case
we have several committees, does not impact security, as far
as consensus algorithm is highly robust. Further, many attacks
require the attacker to control the majority of a committee.
Random selection makes this more and more difficult as the
number of nodes increases. In this sense, security increases
when scaling to higher number of nodes. Clearly, security
is about many other aspects, but the difficulty to subvert the
consensus is usually considered in the context of discussions
about the blockchain trilemma.
b) Committees members selection: Our approach is inde-
pendent on the way members of each committee are selected.
Members can be static or change regularly. Their selection
can be done using a public shared source of randomness or
using verifiable random functions, as in [4]. However, there
is a caveat regarding this in our approach. Since intermediate
results of the pipeline are passed to committees that need them
in the next few rounds, if members of committees change,
these have to be decided and published before data is sent to
them. Note that, resorting to broadcast is not possible since
this would impair scalability.
c) Network communications: In our approach, often
communications involve a multiplicity of nodes as destination
of the message. At the same time, we need to avoid broadcast
to scale with respect to network resources of the nodes, that we
assumed to be constant. We note that the destination of mes-
sages are always bounded in number, hence, scalability can be
theoretically obtained by resorting to unicast communications,
provided that the set of the destinations are known when the
message should be sent. However, most of the communication
needs in our approach seems to be suitable for a multicast de-
livery. However, the use of standard multicast techniques may
not completely suite our needs. In particular, we the following
aspects may be worth noting. 1) the group of the receivers
of a multicast channel might change rapidly, depending on
the round duration. 2) Preparation of the multicast groups
can be performed in advance with respect to when they are
needed. 3) Multicast groups may be needed for only one round
and then discarded. This might simplify the development of
a specific technique for this application. 4) The number of
needed multicast channels might be huge, for example one
for each used address. A complete list of the requirements
of the features needed by each communication used in our
approach is beyond the scope of this paper and it is leaved for
an extended version of the paper.
d) Inter-committees communication: In Section V, we
often relayed on the possibility for a committee to commu-
nicate data to other committees that needs them in the next
rounds. Inter-committees communications should be part of
the consensus protocol, in the sense that each receiver should
be able to check a quorum to accept a communication as
“coming from a committee”. This might imply a quadratic
number of communication in the size of the committees. While
practically this might be a problem, from a theoretical point
of view this is not a problem, since the size of committees is
supposed to be constant.
e) Synchronization and committee decision failing: In
our description, we essentially assumed a sort of global
synchronization. In practice, synchronization spread across a
large number of nodes (although partitioned in committees)
might be difficult to achieve. The problem of modifying our
approach to relax synchronization requirements is left as a
future work. A related problem is the failure of a committee
to reach an agreement, which is unlikely to for a direct attack,
but may occur under large network faults. Again, we left the
investigation of these aspect as a future work.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
We showed a novel blockchain design that shares processing
load for the next block on many parallel executing committees,
potentially covering all nodes, and avoid broadcast in all cases
where this impairs scalability. We provided formal proof of
the scalability of our approach and of its correctness. We also
discussed how scaling does not impair decentralization and
security providing a solution to the well known blockchain
scalability trilemma.
We think that our contribution may stimulate interesting
future works. From a theoretical point of view, inter-committee
communications and synchronization should be better studied
to achieve a solution that is efficient and usable in practice.
From a practical point of view, an experimentation or simula-
tion with realistic parameters would be desirable.
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